Two years after the Peace Accord was signed, the second International Seminar for the Evaluation of its Implementation was held, and the State University System (SUE) acknowledged progress in the laying down of weapons, founding of the FARC political party, demining, the beginning of the Truth, Justice, Reparation, and non-Repetition System, and legislation for implementation. However, the SUE also mentioned delays in integrated rural and political reform, special peace jurisdictions, crop substitution, the application of territorial, gender, and ethnic approaches, and reincorporation.¹ The High Counsellor for Post-Conflict, José Emilio Archila, revealed that almost US$47 million will be needed for implementation over the next 10 years.²

Nine FARC leaders, including Iván Marquez, El Paisa, and Romaña, signed an open letter exposing the reasons for increased mistrust towards the State and calling for the resolution of Jesús Santrich’s legal situation. The leaders, who have left reintegration spaces citing the lack of legal and security guarantees, criticized the modifications made to the Peace Accord and called for the inclusion of third parties and intellectual authors in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). They also warned that creating separate courts within the JEP for military servicepeople would effectively deliver them to the International Criminal Court, stating that this was a “political game” to repress the truth and protect those truly responsible.³

An assessment of the first 100 days of Duque’s Government centers on continued conflict, the Peace Accord, and anti-drugs policy. Of particular concern is the increase in the number of victims of displacement and confinement (up 21% compared with the same period in 2017), the attacks and assassinations of social leaders (up 357% and 143% respectively), and increases in violent deaths in conflict areas. Social protest is also up 59%.⁴ With regards the Peace Accord, President Duque has shown willingness to work with low-ranking former combatants, promoting reintegration and stabilization, but has put pressure on the higher commands and repeat offenders. This has not changed the Accord’s essence, but has affected its approach to political and rural transformation.⁵

In response to increased crimes against social leaders, the GOC began its Timely Prevention and Protection Action Plan (PAO) this week. The PAO’s founding decree considers institutional and territorial articulation, and a communication and training strategy for prevention.⁶ The Observatorio de Violencia Política reports 533 attacks between November 2016 and October 2018, with the majority of targets belonging to victims or land restitution organizations, Community Action Boards, ethnic authorities, or movements against corruption or illegal economies. A pattern amongst perpetrators has proven difficult to define, as they often respond to territorial security dynamics.⁷

The Public Order Law proposed by the GOC has been approved with modifications removing preconditions for beginning negotiations with illegal armed groups. However, its strategic intervention areas and funding may interfere with the Development Plans with a Territorial Focus (PDET) created by the Peace Accord,⁸ and the High Commissioner for Peace, Miguel Ceballos, reiterated the GOC’s demand that the ELN cease criminal actions before peace talks can resume.⁹ He also called on the Cuban authorities to implement INTERPOL’s Red Notice against ELN leader, Nicolás Rodriquez Bautista, alias “Gabino.”¹⁰