The GOC’s National Development Plan (PND) has raised concern due to its focus on military and agroindustrial consolidation at the expense of victims’ reparation and further resources for Peace Accord implementation. It also promotes “cluster” development and property regularization rather than Integrated Rural Reform; outlines Strategic Integrated Intervention Areas (ZEII) which may compete with the Development Plans with a Territorial Focus (PDET); lacks a specific additional Peace Accord and gender approach budget; focuses on demobilization above collective reincorporation; and foresees reparation for 282,000 fewer victims than the previous PND.¹

Only two of the 24 remaining Territorial Training and Reincorporation Spaces (ETCR) have collective productive projects to replace the basic salary and provisions supplied by the GOC until 15 August. To date, only 366 former combatants have benefitted from productive projects (36 initiatives), leading to calls to accelerate the process, ensure their sustainability, purchase land, and develop markets for former combatants’ goods and services.²

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) continues to check on “El Paisa’s” commitments to peace, giving state entities 15 days to report on his whereabouts, rearming, and reincorporation. The former FARC commander has not appeared before the JEP since July last year, when he was called to participate in Case 001 (illegal retentions). If he is deemed not to have fulfilled his commitments to peace, his case will enter the ordinary justice system, which will reactivate the arrest warrants against him.³ The GOC is also hoping for a rapid decision on the status of “Iván Márquez,” who left the Miravalle ETCR soon after El Paisa,⁴ and in favour of the extradition of “Jesus Santrich,” who was arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking in April 2018.⁵ The JEP has extended the deadline for the US to provide evidence in the Santrich case by a further 20 days, after the original request went astray.⁶

The Coalition against the Involvement of Children and Youth in the Armed Conflict (COALICO) will deliver a report on the recruitment of minors to the JEP on 12 February, detailing 50 cases of child recruitment over 2018 (up from 15 in 2016). Almost 2.4 million minors were affected by the armed conflict between 1985 and 1 January 2019, with victimization also including use in civil-military campaigns; forced displacement; violations of the rights to life, integrity, and personal and sexual freedom; attacks and occupations of schools and hospitals; and blocks on basic service, all of which rose last year. In most cases, children were not recruited by force, rather joining armed groups because they saw them as a viable option amid poverty and limited legal opportunities.⁷

In Latin America, land and natural resource defenders who threaten the economic and political interests of state-protected minorities have been most targeted by assassinations, for which high levels of impunity are the norm (95% in Colombia). Despite entering a post-conflict phase, 566 leaders have been assassinated in Colombia since 2016.⁸ The Commission of Colombian Jurists (CCJ) also reported on continuing paramilitary structures (understood as a political, economic, social, and cultural phenomenon), detailing the presence of post-demobilization or paramilitary successor groups in 27 departments (up from 15 in 2006). In this, the CCJ contradicts the GOC’s classification of these groups as “criminal,” with implications for their dismantling.⁹ President Duque announced the “Defence and Security Policy for Legality, Entrepreneurship, and Equity” on 6 February, focusing on dissuasion,¹⁰ and outlining strengthened intelligence bodies and international and civilian cooperation to build peace and security.¹¹ The Minister of the Interior also claims the GOC has attended to 30 of the 31 alerts issued by the Ombudsperson’s Office, and highlights the territorial visits made by the Timely Action Plan (PAO) to protect social leaders.¹²

On 7 February, the ELN freed a soldier kidnapped in Norte de Santander one month previously,¹³ while another cadet injured during the ELN’s 17-January attack on the police academy in Bogotá died a day later, bringing the total to 22 deaths.¹⁴ The GOC increased its military operations against the ELN after ending peace talks following the Bogotá attack,¹⁵ raising concerns over worsening security and displacements.¹⁶ The GOC has also refused to recognize the protocols signed by the Santos administration to ensure the safe return of the ELN delegation, undermining trust and the possibility of a future negotiated end to the conflict.¹⁷