The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) opened Case 006 to investigate the extermination of the Unión Patriótica (UP) political party on 4 March. The case was opened in response to Attorney General’s Office (AGO), National Center of Historical Memory (CNMH), and Corporación Reiniciar, reports indicating that State agents, public forces, paramilitary groups, and civilian third parties participated in the systematic victimization of the UP. The reports identify more than 6,000 victims of over 9,000 violations, including selective assassinations, forced displacement, deaths in massacres, and kidnappings in 27 departments between 1984 and 2002. Perpetrators have enjoyed almost total impunity, with only 246 sentences and 30 convictions being issued through the ordinary justice system. The UP was created as a result of peace talks between the government of Belisario Betancur and the FARC in 1985, and, due to its political persecution, has been recognized as a collective subject for reparations by the Colombian state.¹ Sixteen members of the armed forces have now entered the JEP in this case, as have 13 members of the now-defunct Administrative Department of Security (DAS).²

The JEP is also preparing to hear evidence in Case 003, on extrajudicial killings or “false positives,” on 5 March, when the “Mothers of Soacha” will claim that youths killed and reported as deaths in combat should not be covered by the JEP. The JEP has heard voluntary evidence from 55 members of the armed forces, only one of whom has asked for victims’ forgiveness.³ A recent Human Rights Watch report focuses on nine generals who were promoted by President Duque, despite being implicated in false positives cases being investigated by the AGO.⁴

Following the United States authorities’ confirmation that they will not share evidence in the Jesús Santrich case, the JEP closed its period of seeking evidence, giving his defense and the Inspector General five days to present their arguments. Following this, the JEPS’s Revision Section will decide whether to offer Santrich the non-extradition guarantees laid out in the Peace Accord for former FARC combatants who have disarmed, are in the process of reincorporating, and committed crimes before the Accord was signed on 1 December 2016. Santrich was seen for the first time since his April 2018 arrest on 21 January, when he appeared before the State Council to discuss his Congress investiture;⁵ the Council later announced that he would maintain his seat until the extradition case is concluded.⁶ This decision came amidst the scandal caused by the capture of the JEP’s Support Attorney, suspected of receiving US$500,000 to influence the Santrich case,⁷ confirming this as the peace process’ most controversial case.⁸ The JEP’s legitimacy is also under fire as President Duque considers whether to accept its Statutory Law; he has until 11 March to make a decision.⁹

The FARC house representative denounced the lack of funding and state reticence toward reincorporation initiatives on 3 March, following the Reincorporation and Normalization Agency’s (ARN) failure to complete payments for former FARC combatants scheduled for 16 February. Many former combatants have abandoned their Territorial Training and Reincorporation Spaces (ETCR) amid growing uncertainty surrounding their legal, physical, and socioeconomic security. The latest delay raises questions as to whether the monthly payments, which were agreed in the Peace Accord and should continue until August 2019, may be permanently suspended. In addition, the state has not delivered land for former combatants to implement their productive projects and build a sense of territorial belonging, and the National Development Plan has reduced funding for peace initiatives.¹⁰

Despite being the most-attacked armed group in the country last year, the Clan del Golfo faded from the national agenda with the failure of the tailor-made law for their submission to justice and the ELN’s 17-January attack on a Bogotá police academy. The Clan hast lost a large part of its leadership to state military operations and confrontations with its own dissident groups, operating in alliance the ELN and FARC splinter groups. The group maintains control of drug trafficking routes, extorsion, and micro-trafficking economies, however, relying on increased territorial mobility, regional (rather than international) actions, and the resources to buy arms and pay double the minimum salary, a particularly attractive prospect for vulnerable and inexperienced migrants.¹¹